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court did not err in concluding the State owns the mineral interests under the
shore zone.
Consequently, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the State. However, the Court stressed that its decision does not preclude an upland owner
from taking to the low watermark if it can establish a chain of title wherein the
State granted its equal footing interest to the upland owner.
Ashley Basta

UTAH
Delta Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Fam. Ranch, LC, 321 P.3d 1027 (Utah
2013) (holding (i) partial forfeiture was available before statutory amendment
specifically providing for such forfeiture became effective when forfeiture was
inherent in the principle of beneficial use; and (ii) statutory exemption for time
periods when water was insufficient to satisfy a water allowance did not prevent
forfeiture of available but unused water).
Delta Canal Company, Melville Irrigation Company, Abraham Irrigation
Company, and Central Utah Water Company (collectively, "Irrigation Companies") and Frank Vincent Family Ranch ("Vincent") were water rights holders
on the Sevier River system. Vincent purchased the water right at issue from the
Samuel McIntyre Investment Company (McIntyre) in 1998. McIntyre originally obtained the water right in 1936 as part of the general adjudication of the
Sevier River system. A district court at the time issued the "Cox Decree," awarding McIntyre twenty-two cubic feet of water per second (c.f.s.) from March 1
through October 1 of each year and a storage component from April 16 to October 1. The Irrigation Companies filed a complaint alleging that Vincent partially forfeited and partially abandoned its water right.
The Irrigation Companies alleged that during the twenty-two year period
leading up to the filing of their 2008 complaint, Vincent and McIntyre forfeited
and abandoned a portion of their water right. They claimed that from 1988 to
1998 McIntyre irrigated only 830 of its 1,051.5 acres, and that Vincent cultivated
less than 900 acres after 1998. Vincent countered that it did not cultivate the
full acreage for several reasons: first, the Sevier River Commissioner reduced
Vincent's diversion right during water shortages; next, Vincent could not use the
land beneficially due to frozen and unprepared ground; and finally, no storage
right was available at that time.
The district court held Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture or
partial abandonment before 2002, and an exception in Utah Code section 731-4(3)(f)(i) shielded Vincent from the same after 2002. The exception provided
that partial forfeiture and partial abandonment provisions did not apply in times
when surface water sources did not yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right,
or when groundwater was unavailable due to sustained drought. The district
court found that because Vincent had not received an uninterrupted flow of
twenty-two c.f.s. between 2002 and the filing of the complaint, the Irrigation
Companies could not claim partial forfeiture or abandonment. Accordingly,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vincent. The Irrigation
Companies appealed to the Utah Supreme Court ("Court").
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First, the Court addressed whether partial forfeiture was available in Utah
before 2002. Vincent argued that such doctrine was not available and cited
precedent holding that Utah statutes did not address partial forfeiture. The
Court disagreed and determined that a review of the case law showed that the
recognition of partial forfeiture extended as far back as 1897. In addition, the
Court noted the pre-2002 Utah Code provision, which provided that a water
right ceased when an appropriator abandons or stops using water for a five year
period, did not specify whether "water right" should be read to include portions
of an appropriator's water right. Accordingly, the Court observed that a reasonable interpretation of this provision could state that forfeiture occurs when an
appropriator ceases to use either a portion or the entirety of the water right. In
resolving that ambiguity, the Court examined Utah's forfeiture and beneficial
use statutes under the principle that the interpretation of a statute must be in
harmony with neighboring provisions. It rejected Vincent's interpretation that
partial use was sufficient to maintain a water right under the forfeiture statute, as
this was inconsistent with Utah's beneficial use policy of preventing water from
running without its application to beneficent uses, such as those promoting conservation, recreation, and other values deemed socially desirable, for any number of years. The Court concluded that forfeiture and partial forfeiture were
inherent in the concept of beneficial use, and that when read together, the forfeiture and beneficial use statutes allowed the forfeiture of a water right in part
or in whole.
Next, the Court considered whether the exemption in the post-2002 Utah
forfeiture statute disallowed the forfeiture of Vincent's water right. The Court
rejected the district court's interpretation that the statutory exemption barred
forfeiture of any amount in periods when a water right was not satisfied. It considered that such interpretation was inconsistent with beneficial use, by which
validity of a water right is contingent on use. The Court reasoned that such
interpretation would allow an appropriator to use a small deficit of water to protect a water right from forfeiture even if most of the water was actually available
but not put to use. However, the Court maintained that the post-2002 statute
was a codification of the common law physical-causes exception, which protected appropriators from forfeiture who made beneficial use of material
amounts of available water.
Subsequently, the Court addressed whether Vincent had abandoned a portion of its water right. The Court disagreed with the district court's summary
judgment ruling on the abandonment claim, because such ruling hinged on the
same erroneous interpretation of the physical-causes exception statute. Further,
the Court determined that abandonment was not a statutory claim under the
forfeiture provisions. The Court reasoned that abandonment was different
from forfeiture because it required definite intent to relinquish a water right and
did not require a specific period of time, whereas forfeiture required that the
appropriator cease to use the water for a period of five years. Accordingly, the
Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the abandonment claim and
remanded for reconsideration.
Further, the Court considered the extent of Vincent's water right. The
Court determined that Vincent's water right was not a continuous award. It
pointed out that the Cox Decree specified only flow and allowing a constant
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diversion of twenty-two c.f.s. would result in a diversion greater than 9,000 acrefeet of water, far surpassing any quantity Vincent and its predecessor had ever
used. In addition, the Court pointed out that the Cox Decree did not dispute
the proposed determination drawn up in preparation for the 1936 general adjudication of the Sevier River system, which indicated that Vincent's predecessor
used 5,000 acre-feet of water annually. Thus, it was reasonable to infer that the
volume component of Vincent's water right was 5,000 acre-feet.
Last, the Court considered various issues that could potentially arise on remand. The Court first outlined a proper forfeiture analysis. It declared that
because flow awards are not continuous, a failure to divert the maximum
amount allowed did not result in automatic forfeiture. It recognized that a forfeiture analysis should focus on whether the appropriator has failed to use material amounts of its volume allowance. Also, the Court maintained that the
number of acres irrigated was not determinative of forfeiture. Rather, the deciding factor was whether the appropriator used all of its water allowance in a
reasonable manner and for a beneficial purpose. Thereafter, the Court addressed whether the water available to Vincent and its predecessor between
March 1 and April 15 should count as available water for purposes of forfeiture.
It reasoned that distinguishing the pre-irrigation season would be significant only
in a drought year under the physical-causes exception. Additionally, it determined that because the Cox Decree did not provide otherwise, it did not have
to exclude early water from the physical exception analysis. Last, the Court
noted that contrary to Vincent's claim, the watering of indigenous vegetation was
generally not beneficial use and that a trier of fact should be wary of such use to
prevent forfeiture.
Edgar Banaza

WASHINGTON
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 311 P.3d
6 (Wash. 2013) (holding a Department of Ecology rule invalid because the Department of Ecology may not rely upon the water code's statutory exception for
overriding considerations of public interest as broad authority to reallocate water
from established minimum flow rights to reserve water for future beneficial
uses).
The Skagit River system supplies water to numerous water rights holders
and is the only river system in the contiguous United States that accommodates
all six species of Pacific salmon. In 2001, the Washington State Department of
Ecology -("Ecology") enacted the Skagit River Basin Instream Flow Rule ("Instream Flow Rule"), which established minimum instream flow requirements to
protect wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic values.
In 2003, Skagit County and others filed suit against Ecology challenging the
Instream Flow Rule. Skagit County argued the Rule was invalid because it did
not allocate noninterruptible water for new uses and thus effectively prevented
any new development that required water throughout the year. After several
years, Skagit County and Ecology agreed to a settlement that resulted in Ecology
promulgating an amended instream flow rule ("Amended Rule"). The

